
Clément Molin
Map of the Turkish - Russian opposition

Clément Molin
Map of the Turkish - Russian opposition
Clément Molin
If there is one state that is not at all displeased with these Ukrainian strikes 🇺🇦, it is Turkey 🇹🇷. Over the past five years, the Russian Black Sea Fleet 🇷🇺 has been dealt heavy blows, losing numerous vessels and being forced to retreat toward Novorossiysk. A significant portion of Russia’s radar installations in Crimea has also been destroyed. Meanwhile, the Mediterranean fleet has largely had to abandon the port of Tartus in Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Russia has since shifted its regional foothold to Libya 🇱🇾—specifically eastern Libya, controlled by the Libyan National Army (LNA)—using the port of Tobruk to offload equipment, the port of Benghazi as a support base for its fleet, and the Maaten al-Sarra airbase as a command hub for the Russian "Afrika Corps." Turkey, which has historically been close to the Government of National Unity (GNU)—the internationally recognized Libyan authority—has for some time been playing a double game. Turkish influence in Libya runs deep, with several military bases in the west and extensive cooperation with the GNU, even as a rapprochement with the eastern part of the country is underway. Ankara appears to be seeking a gradual reunification of the nation: ▫️May 2026 – Defense Minister Yaşar Güler meets with Saddam Haftar and Abdulsalam al-Zoubi, a senior defense official from Tripoli. ▫️June 23, 2026 – Intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalın meets with Saddam Haftar in Benghazi. ▫️August 2026 – Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan
Clément Molin
Yesterday in Benghazi, LNA air-defense was active to counter drone threat, while the corvette was getting attacked. Powerful ammunition explosions happened and destroyed the ship. Today, another USV attack targeted a Russian shadow fleet ship few kilometers from Benghazi. Multiple videos show this attack. Earlier, helicopters attacked Ukrainian USVs in the Mediterranean sea. At the end, one ship was hit at least in this new attack. This shows how Russian shadow fleet and military navy is increasingly being attacked elsewhere than in the Black Sea.

Clément Molin
1/2 After the Baltic sea and the Black sea, the war in Ukraine 🇺🇦 is expanding into the Mediterranean sea Yesterday evening, Ukrainian sea drones sank a Russian 🇷🇺 corvette in Benghazi port, followed by another strike on a shadow fleet ship today. For years, Ukraine has been tracking Russia abroad, from SOF deployment in Sudan or Mali to attacks against Russian interests in many countries. Recently, Ukrainian forces were deployed to Libya in order to train local forces but also use the territory to attack Russian shadow fleet. In total, 3 Russian tankers have already been hit by Ukrainian drones in December 2025, March 2026 and September 2026. A Naval drone was even found in Greece, which forced Ukraine to apologies to Athens. Yesterday, Ukrainian drones (sea and air ?) attacked Russian Merkuriy corvette, which was used to escort Russia's shadow fleet. In recent months, Ukrainian allies intercepted multiple shadow fleet ships, while Ukraine attacked others. Thus Russia is trying to protect them.

Clément Molin
Sudan 🇸🇩 - Rapid Support Forces offensive from Ethiopia is now threatening southern Sudan While the army continues to advance in Western Kordofan state, closing in on Abu Zabad and En Nahud, the Rapid Support Forces are pushing in the southern part of the country. Heavily supported by Ethiopia, which is hosting their rear bases, including drone bases and the UAE, supplying them with weapons, the RSF and SPLM-N are jointly advancing in the Blue Nile State. In recent days, they are getting closer to Damazin, an important town of southern Sudan.
Clément Molin
At the same time, clearing effort has been ongoing for some time near Dachne and Filya further north, near Novopavlivka. Overall, the situation is tensed for Russian forces which are struggling to bring manpower to the front and to fight against superior Ukrainian strikes. Their main logistical node, Velika Novosilka, is constantly being attacked by Ukrainian glide bombs as well as FPV and fixed wings drones. With the Ukrainians closing in, the logistical situation for the Russians will worsen, especially since they barely use UGVs for their logistic and rely on men and small vehicles. We will see in the next few weeks if the Ukrainians choose to continue the offensive against the weakened Russia's 29th CAA or if they dig in for the winter.
Clément Molin
On the Velika Novosilka direction, it seems the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 armed forces took back control of the main defensive line and continued advancing further east and south On the southern part, they cleared most (not all, many Russians are still behind) of the 2024 defensive line (the 2nd one) and the important bunkers that are present along it. The line in itself is not the best defensive position, but there is a useful anti-tank ditch and many bunkers. On the eastern part, Ukraine cleared all the western bank of the Mokri Yali river, which is much more interesting. If it is correctly defended with drones, Russia will suffer from more casualties trying to cross it back. Thus, all the main defensive line that was taken after Velika Novosilka fell is now cleared In recent days, Komar was reportedly liberated, which is very important since the town is the largest one in the region and provides cover for drone teams and infantry. Ukraine is currently pushing further east of Komar, as well as south along the river
Clément Molin
🇺🇦🇷🇺 Kerch Bridge strike: isolating Crimea By hitting the Kerch road bridge, Ukraine continues a strategy launched this summer: cut Crimea off from the rest of occupied Ukraine and choke Russian logistics. The bridge no longer carries most military traffic, and the 2–4 remaining ferries lack capacity. Ukraine has also hit the bridges linking Crimea to the mainland, the R280 Rostov–Crimea highway, and now Taganrog and the Mius River bridges. Detours via pontoons and back roads slow trucks down, making fuel and food convoys easy prey for mid-range drones. ~2.5M people in Crimea now rely mainly on the land bridge, while Russia must also supply Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. Likely next targets: the rail bridge, the Taman substation and sea routes. Goal: deny Russia Crimea as a launch pad for missiles and drones, and isolate the southern front.
Clément Molin
After a very difficult summer for Ukraine, with massive missile strikes, a constant presence of Geran drones over the main cities and continued targeting of civilian infrastructure, there has been a relative decline at the start of autumn. The main reason is Russia’s launch of a strike campaign toward western Ukraine, with a focus on electrical substations and energy infrastructure outside the large cities. In Kyiv, for example, the number of strikes and impacts, whether from missiles or drones, has fallen in recent months, following a very difficult September. The same trend is visible in Kharkiv, although it is worth noting that FPV drone and guided bomb strikes are intensifying there, as in Zaporizhzhia, where they are replacing the Geran drones. In Dnipro, the number of Russian strikes, by missiles or drones, is currently rising, and in Odesa, after the summer peak, a slow decline is under way.
Clément Molin
Last night, Ukraine 🇺🇦 destroyed the Kerch bridge linking Crimea to Russia 🇷🇺 Now that ferries have been destroyed, as well as the bridge, the only alternative for Russia is to use R-280 road from Rostov to Crimea, the so-called "land bridge". This summer, this road increasingly came under Ukrainian mid-range drone strikes, hundreds of trucks were hit and destroyed on this key highway. Ukraine also hit multiple bridges, including all bridges linking Crimea to Kherson oblast. In recent days, strikes targeted bridges in Rostov and near Taganrog, damaging multiple ones on the border with Ukraine. It is now more difficult to take the road from Rostov to Crimea. Data of strikes from @UAControlMap
Clément Molin
Map update on Ukrainian strike on key bridges Ukraine 🇺🇦 is trying to cut the Azov sea ring with strikes in 3 different areas : ▫️The land road is being cut with strikes near the border, between Taganrog and Mariupol. ▫️The link between southern Ukraine and Crimea is constantly under attack with strikes on the bridges near Perekop, Conhar and the Arabat Spit. ▫️The Kerch bridge is currently under attack by drones and missiles
Clément Molin
As mentioned in yesterday’s tweet, both Ukrainians and Russians are heavily targeting each other’s bridges. 🇷🇺 This evening, several Russian missiles struck bridges in the north and south of Kyiv. 🇺🇦 Meanwhile, Ukrainian drone strikes are underway against the Kerch Bridge, following the start of a campaign last night. -> Both sides are targeting each other’s strategic bridges; Russia is seeking to sever the connection between the two banks of Kyiv. -> Ukraine has also struck bridges connecting the land corridor to Crimea (in Russian-occupied southern Ukraine) with southern Russia. Targeting the Kerch Bridge is a logical next step toward isolating Russian logistics in Crimea. The attack on the Kerch 🇷🇺 bridge is ongoing. It appears that multiple missiles/drones have struck the central section of the bridge, which had already sustained some damage yesterday. This is a highly significant strike, and we expect to have more information tomorrow regarding the outcome.
Clément Molin
Frontline update in Sudan 🇸🇩, important breakthrough for the Sudanese Armed Forces 🟢 After they reopened the critical Khartoum - El Obeid road a few months ago, the SAF continued to push westwards. In recent days, they broke through the frontline and started a flanking maneuver against Rapid Support Forces troops on the En Nahud - El Obeid road. According to my information, it seems the SAF are currently aiming for Abu Zabad instead of En Nahud. Capturing this town would isolate the RSF aligned SPLM-N movement and push back the threat from El Obeid, a strategic city in central Sudan. With this recent progression on the Kordofan front and the continued presence of SAF aligned Darfuri rebels in North Darfur, especially near Al Fashir and Al Geneina, the RSF base in Darfur could be threatened. It is worth noting the army changed a lot since 2023, from a very heavy army with tanks and armored vehicles to a mobile force with many allied militias.
Clément Molin
Map to illustrate my comments :
Clément Molin
Today, Russia is therefore trying to achieve through political and diplomatic negotiations the military objectives it set itself in 2022. These military objectives are a minimum. Nothing suggests that Russia intends to stop its war once the Donbas is under its control. Russian strategy is now very clear. This year, Russia failed in its battle for Sloviansk through the two strategic locks: Lyman in the north, where the prospects of capture are fading fast, and Mykolaivka in the east, where the front has been pushed back. The risk of a Russian capture of Sloviansk remains very limited. So all Russian reserves are heading south. First, from Pokrovsk, Russian forces have been attacking northwards for months. Fighting is under way inside Dobropillia, and they hope to capture the town this coming winter. They would then use it to launch offensives towards Bilozerske, Novodonetske, Oleksandrivka and then Barvinkove, towns located west of the Donbas. To do so, they will have to break through the new Ukrainian defensive lines, which are much stronger. They will also have to enter an area with very few urban areas. These offensives are therefore the Russian army’s long-term objective. At the same time, if these objectives are not achieved, Russia will try by every means to push towards Druzhkivka, the last lock south of Kramatorsk. Since the battle for Kostiantynivka is still under way and Russian forces have not yet taken full control of the town, the battle for Druzhkivka has not started. The Russians are therefore focusing their assaults on Dobropillia and Kostiantynivka. At the same time, they are attacking across the fields and through the Ukrainian fortifications on the high ground between Druzhkivka and Dobropillia. This is where the war will be decided. The Ukrainians have managed to stop the Russian offensive on Sloviansk and to slow down the one on Kramatorsk considerably. They have, to some extent, stabilised the situation in Kostiantynivka. They have pushed the Russians back at Lyman and, further south, at Novopavlivka. The only front where Russia is still making gains is Dobropillia, and this is the region that is strategic for the future of the conflict. That is why Russia hopes to seize it without a fight. Thanks for following !
Clément Molin
During recent negociations, we heard some words about an exchange, Ukraine 🇺🇦 in NATO and Russia 🇷🇺 taking all of Donbas But why is Russia that much obsessed by taking Donbas on the negociation field and not on the battlefield ? I read an interesting explanation on a Russian channel recently : "The task of liberating Sloviansk and Kramatorsk becomes extremely difficult. If we do not secure access to the borders of these two cities during the winter campaign, then liberating these settlements in 2027 will be a task that is, in all likelihood, impossible to achieve." What they are not saying is that the battle for Donbas has been going on since 2014 and most of the Russian offensives have been going on in the region since June 2022. Putin asked a large number of time his army to seize the region but they still didn't manage to do it. ▫️▫️▫️Battle for Western Donbas▫️▫️▫️ Since October 2023, Russian forces are fighting a prolonged battle for the "western fortress belt". After they secured Donetsk suburbs during the first 6 months of 2024 (battle was ongoing since 2014), Russia assaulted the western Donbas fortress belt, composed of multiple small mining cities, most very close to each other. The battle started in Novohrodivka and Selydove and continued in Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Rodynske, Bilytske and now Dobropilla. During this battle, Russia suffered from at least 150 000 casualties. But the Russian objective was never to conquer these small mining towns in the western Donbas. Russia’s stated goal since 2022 has been to take control of the fortress belt, the large Donbas cities still held by Ukraine, especially Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. If the Russians had managed to capture Bakhmut and Soledar as early as late 2022 or early 2023, they could have hoped to push west towards these cities. But they failed, first at Chasiv Yar and then at Siversk. A frontal assault on the fortress cities was therefore called into question. So from late 2023 the Russian army began a large outflanking manoeuvre through the south and west of the Donbas. It first “liberated,” the heavily fortified western suburbs of Donetsk, and then advanced into the western fortress of the Donbas. Moving north step by step, the Russians are now attacking the fortress from the south and from the east. Meanwhile, they have taken control of Siversk. And after more than three years of fighting for Chasiv Yar, the town still cannot be used to launch offensives on Kramatorsk. ▫️▫️▫️Battle for Kostiantynivka▫️▫️▫️ The battle for Kostiantynivka, which began more than a year ago, is still under way. The Russians are struggling to keep pushing north, first towards Druzhkivka, the last lock south of Kramatorsk, and then towards the large fortress cities of the Donbas. This is why Russian forces are putting maximum effort into encircling the Donbas from the west and the north. In the west, they had relatively great success in 2024 and 2025, and the fighting for Dobropillia is therefore decisive. The Russians hope to seize the town in order to launch offensives towards Barvinkove, a town in Kharkiv Oblast that serves as a logistics hub for the Donbas. ▫️▫️▫️Defeat in Northern Donbas▫️▫️▫️ At the same time, the Russians hoped to launch an offensive from the north. Until early summer, they had a chance to capture Lyman, the key town that protects Sloviansk from the north. Had they taken it, they would probably have pushed along the Siverskyi Donets River, reached Izium and cut one of the main supply routes from Kharkiv to Sloviansk. They could then have crossed the river and infiltrated deep behind the lines to attack the Donbas from its northern flank. Thanks to Operation Vivaldi, carried out by the Ukrainian army, this plan failed. The Russians can now only attack from the south or launch frontal assaults, all of which have so far been repelled east of Sloviansk. ▫️▫️▫️What is Russia's plan▫️▫️▫️
Clément Molin
So overall, why is this war crucial for the region ? ▫️This is not a local or civil war, it's a regional war with multiple countries implicated, including Middle Eastern ones. ▫️What happens in Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan or Chad is strongly linked to it. ▫️There are multiple important topics around this war : Sudan is a crossroad, close to the naval routes of the Red sea, there is oil, gold, natural ressources, Nile waters and regional power implications. ▫️This war is also a humanitarian tragedy for the Sudanese people and is slowly spreading in the region. I remain commited to follow the evolution of this war, if you want to discuss it with me, you can DM me. I will later update on the precise frontline situation.
Clément Molin
What are the international supports ? 🔴The RSF are armed, financed and supported on a daily basis by the UAE, which are using multiple allied countries in the region to help them, like LNA (Libya), Chad, CAR, South Sudan, Ethiopia and breakaway regions of Somalia. Kenya and Uganda are indirectly supporting the RSF. 🟢The SAF are being armed, supported and financed by multiple countries with different interests. Turkyie, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are the main sponsors, together with Egypt and Eritrea. Also, Iran or Somalia are closer to the SAF than to the RSF. Elsewhere, western countries do not have a clear position, especially since they are close to the UAE, same for India or China. Russia is now more openly supporting the Army despite the fact Wagner backed the RSF during two years.
Clément Molin
Where is the war currently being waged ? ▫️There are currently 4 different fronts in this war. The main one is happening in the Kordofan region, around the key city of El Obeid. Recently, the SAF managed to push back the RSF from the city outskirts and reached yesterday En Nahud west of it. ▫️A battle is also ongoing in Nlue Nile state, south of Damazin, with RSF using Ethiopian territory to attack the army. ▫️Battles are also ongoing between the SAF and SPLM-N rebels in the Nuba mountains around Dilling and Kadugli. ▫️Battles are still ongoing in the northern desert along the supply road to Libya and in northern Darfur along the Chadian border. How is the war fought ? Most of the battles happen with pick-up trucks and heavily mobile force. However, more and more MALE drones are being used as well as some FPV drones. There is few artillery strikes but there are many long range kamikaze drone strikes against eachother rear infrastructure.
Clément Molin
What happened during the war ? ▫️A large battle for the capital Khartoum lasted 2 years and was finally won by the army in early 2025. ▫️The RSF were pushed back from the south of the country (between blue and white Nile) at the end of 2024 ▫️The army lost all garrisons in the west (Darfur) and partly in the Kordofan. The country is effectively cut in 2 parts. Who is fighting the war ? 🟢The Army is supported by former Darfuri rebels, islamic groups and local militias from the east and the south. Most of their soldiers are Nilotic arabs. 🔴The rebels are composed of Baggara arabs from Sudan but also neighbouring countries, aligned militias like the SPLM-N of the Nuba moutains and multiple smaller groups and foreign mercenaries. What do they control ? ▫️The RSF control most of Darfur and part of Kordofan, as well as a corridor to Libya and some positions on the Ethiopia-Sudan border in Blue Nile State. ▫️The SAF control all the Nile river, the eastern Red sea coast, the capital city and the main cities.
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